

RICHARD YETTER CHAPPELL

CONTACT INFORMATION

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AREA OF SPECIALIZATION

Normative Ethics, Metaethics

AREAS OF TEACHING COMPETENCE

Metaphysics, Epistemology, Applied Ethics, Political Philosophy

EDUCATION

Princeton University

Ph.D., expected May 2012

Dissertation Topic: *Fitting Consequentialism* (Advisors: Michael Smith, Philip Pettit)

Australian National University

B.A. (hons) first class, 2006

Honors Thesis: *Modal Rationalism* (Advisor: David Chalmers)

University of Canterbury

B.A., 2005

PUBLICATIONS

'Fittingness: The Sole Normative Primitive', forthcoming in *Philosophical Quarterly* (previous working title: 'Fitting Attitudes for Consequentialists')

'Knowing What Matters', forthcoming in P. Singer (ed.), *Does Anything Really Matter? Parfit on Objectivity*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

WORKS IN PROGRESS

'The Fitting and the Fortunate' (under Revise & Resubmit at *Nous*)

'What's Fit for the Fallible'

‘Value Holism’

‘Mind-Body Meets Metaethics: The Moral Concept Strategy’ (with Helen Yetter Chappell)

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

- FALL 2011 *Practical Ethics*, Princeton University (Prof. Peter Singer)
Leading a weekly discussion section and grading papers & exams in this advanced undergraduate class.
- SUMMER 2010 *Introduction to Philosophy*, Mercer County Community College
Co-taught (with Helen Yetter Chappell) mixed lecture/discussion class of 15 students. Full course responsibility, including curriculum design.
- SPRING 2010 *Introduction to Moral Philosophy*, Princeton University (Prof. Michael Smith)
Led a weekly discussion section and graded papers and exams.
- FALL 2009 *Practical Ethics*, Princeton University (Prof. Peter Singer)
Led two weekly discussion sections and graded papers and exams in this advanced undergraduate class.
- FALL 2008 *Introduction to Metaphysics and Epistemology*, Princeton (Prof. Michael Fara)
Led three weekly discussion sections and graded papers and exams.
- SPRING 2007 *Truth and Reason*, University of Canterbury (Prof. Carolyn Mason)
Led a weekly tutorial section for this intro logic / critical thinking class.

PRESENTATIONS

- “Consequentialist Agents: The Fitting and the Fortunate”
Washington University St. Louis, January 2011
- “Moral Primitives: Fitting Attitudes for Consequentialists”
ANU PhilSoc, August 2010
- “Value Holism”
University of Canterbury Philosophy Discussion Retreat, July 2010
- “Rational Irrationality and Sophisticated Consequentialism”
Princeton Philosophical Society, October 2009
- Comments on Erica Roedder’s ‘Epistemology and Implicit Racial Bias’
Princeton University Moral Psychology Conference, November 2008
- “Metaphysics and Political Philosophy”
Princeton Philosophical Society, October 2008

HONOURS

2010 – Laurance S. Rockefeller Graduate Prize Fellowship, University Center for Human Values, Princeton University.

2007 – Merit Prize from the University Center for Human Values, Princeton University.

2007 – Fulbright New Zealand General Graduate Award (declined for visa reasons).

2006 – University Medal, ANU.

2006 – Quentin Gibson Prize for Philosophy, ANU.

SERVICE

Referee for the *Journal of Moral Philosophy*

PhilPapers.org category editor for [Consequentialism](#) and [Population Ethics](#)

Princeton-Rutgers Graduate Conference Referee, 2008-2010

Princeton philosophy department Course Allocation Committee, 2007/08

Co-founder of the Princeton chapter of [Giving What We Can](#), a philanthropic society

Founder of the *Philosophers' Carnival*: <http://philosophycarnival.blogspot.com/>

Founder of the (1000+ members strong) Facebook group *Open Access Philosophy*:

<http://www.facebook.com/group.php?gid=19809178286>

DISSERTATION ABSTRACT

According to the Fitting Attitudes analysis of value, we can understand *value* in terms of *desirability* or what it is fitting to desire. But we can also raise normative questions about the fittingness of (e.g.) beliefs, emotions, and choices. My dissertation explores the broader significance of such ‘fittingness’ evaluations from a consequentialist standpoint. This project has both a normative and a metaethical component. The normative component develops and assesses the consequentialist’s conception of a morally fitting (or virtuous) agent, thereby responding to several traditional character-based objections to the view. Critics have alleged, for example, that a consequentialist agent would see people as mere value receptacles, be cold and calculating, untrustworthy, and disturbingly ‘alienated’ from themselves and others. I rebut these charges. The metaethical component of my project explores how attention to the possible types of ‘fittingness’ evaluations can help us to define the scope and limits of normative theorizing, with important implications for how we should formulate consequentialism. In particular, I argue that even if we think that what’s right is *determined* by the value facts, we should not go so far as to think that rightness is conceptually *reducible* to goodness.

Advisors: Michael Smith and Philip Pettit