



Recollection, Indian and Platonic

Punar ehi vācas pate devena manasā saha
Vasoh pate ni ramaya mayy evāstu mayi śrutam

AV 1.1.2¹

Cathedram habet in caelo qui intus corda docet.

St. Augustine, *In epist. Joannis ad Parthos*

My Lord embraces all things in His knowledge; will you
not remember?

Koran vi.80, tr. A. J. Arberry

In the following article, the doctrine that what we call "learning" is really a "remembering" and that our "knowledge" is by participation in the Omniscience of an immanent spiritual principle will be traced in Indian and Platonic texts. This corresponds, in the same Perennial Philosophy, to the doctrine that the beautiful is such by a participation in Beauty, and all being a participation of Being absolutely.

The omniscience of the immanent spiritual principle, *intellectus vel spiritus*, is the logical correlative of its timeless omnipresence. It is only from this point of view that the concept of a Providence (*prajñā, πρόνοια, προμήθεια*) becomes intelligible. The Providential Self (*prajñātman*) does not arbitrarily decree our "Fate" but is the witness of its operation: our Fate is merely the temporal extension of its free and instant act of being. It is only because we think of Providence as a foreknowledge of the

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¹ AV 1.1.2: "Come thou again, O Lord of Speech, with the divine mind, infix it, O Lord of Weal, in me, yea in me let thy lore abide." Cf. AV 1.1.4, *sam śrutena gamemahi*, "May we be familiar with thy lore," where *sam gam* corresponds to *anubhū* in other contexts. Cf. also AĀ 11.2.7, *Āvir āvir me edhi . . . mā śrutam me pra hasi*, "Do thou (Ātman, Brahma) be revealed to me, may thy lore not forsake me" (Keith's rendering).

St. Augustine: "His throne is in heaven who teaches from within the heart." Cf. RU 111.9.23, "the support of Truth is in the heart."

future that we are confused; as if we asked, What was God thinking in a time before time was! Actually, Providential knowledge is no more of a future than of a past, but only of a *now*. Experience of duration is incompatible with omniscience, of which the empirical self is therefore incapable.

On the other hand, to the extent that we are able to identify ourselves with the Providential Self itself—Γνώθι σεαυτόν, That art thou—we rise above the sequences of Fate, becoming their spectator rather than their victim. Thus the doctrine that all knowledge is by participation is inseparably connected with the possibility of Liberation (*μοκῆσα, λύσις*) from the pairs of opposites, of which past and future, here and there, are the pertinent instances in the present context. As Nicholas of Cusa has expressed it, the wall of the Paradise in which God dwells is made up of these contraries, and the strait way in, guarded by the highest spirit of Reason, lies between them. In other words, our Way lies through the now and nowhere of which empirical experience is impossible, though the fact of Memory assures us that the Way is open to Comprehensors of the Truth.

The Gāyatrī (RV III.62.10) invokes Savitṛ to “impel our intellections” (*dhiyo yo nah pracodayāt*), or better, “our speculations.”² AĀ II.3.5 tells us that “the self that is in speech (*vāc*)”³ is incomplete, since one intuitively (*erlebt, anubhavati*)⁴ when impelled to thought (*manasē*) by the Breath (*prāṇena*), not when impelled by speech.⁵ “Breath” is to be understood here in its highest sense, common in the *Aitareya Āraṇyaka*, that of Brahma and immanent solar Self, and as in BU II.5.19, *ayam ātmā brahma*

² MU VI.10 explains *dhiyaḥ* by *buddhayaḥ*; the *dhira* is “contemplative” rather than merely “wise.” With *pracodayāt*, cf. MU II.6 *prātibodhanāya* and *pracodayitr*.

³ The powers of the soul are called “selves” in CU VIII.8.12.4 ff. and Kaus. Up. IV.20. That is to say, “the self of speech” means the man considered as a speaker. In this sense, man has as many selves as he has powers.

⁴ *Anubhū* (cf. “gleichkommen” and *acognoscere*) is literally “to come to be along with,” or “adapted or conformed to, or identified with” the object of knowledge, whether in the epistemological or the erotic (JUB I.54.7) sense; cf. *adaequatio rei et intellectus*. [Cf. *anu* . . . *vid* in RV IV.27.1 = *σύνεσις* as defined in *Cratylus* 412.] We have tried to suggest this content by using the word “intuit,” and sometimes “experience” (with implied “immediacy”), reserving “know” for *jñā*.

⁵ This hardly differs from Keith’s version. On *Manas* (and *Vāc*), cf. Coomaraswamy, “On Being in One’s Right Mind,” 1942, p. 11; and CU VIII.12.5, “Now he who knows, ‘Let me think this’—that is the Self (*ātman*, Spirit). The Mind is his ‘divine eye’ (*daiva cakṣus*); he, verily, with that divine eye, the Mind, beholds these objects of desire, and is content.” Mind is the “prior” and the “overlord” of the other powers of the soul (SB X.5.3.7, XIV.3.2.3).

sarvānubhūh, “this Self, Brahma, experient of all.”⁶ The sense is, then, that it is not by what we are told, but by the indwelling Spirit, that we know and understand the thing to which words can only refer us; that which is audibly or otherwise sensed does not in itself inform us, but merely provides the occasion and opportunity to re-cognize the matter to which the external signs have referred us.

While these texts unmistakably present us with the notions of illumination and inspiration, we should not propose to deduce from them alone a fully developed theory of “Recollection” (*smara, smṛti; sati*) without further support; we cite them first by way of introduction to other texts treating directly of Memory.

The doctrine is simply stated in CU VII.26.1: “Memory is from the Self, or Spirit” (*ātmatā smarah*). For “the Self knows everything” (*sarvam ātmā jānīte*, MU VI.7), “this Great Being is just a recognition-mass” (*vijñānaghana*, BU II.4.12), or “pre-cognition-mass” (*prajñāna-ghana*, BU IV.5.13, cf. Māṇḍ. Up. 5). Brahma, Self, is “intuitive of everything” (*sarvānubhūh*, BU II.2.19) because, as Śaṅkara says, it is the “Self of all” (*sarvātman*); He, indeed, is “the only seer, hearer, thinker, knower, and fructuary in us” (BU III.8.1.1, IV.5.15; cf. AĀ III.2.4) and therefore, because of His timeless omnipresence, *must* be omniscient. Memory is a participation of His awareness who never himself “remembers” anything, because he never forgets. “Memory,” as Plotinus says, “is for those who have forgotten.”⁷

CU VII.13.1 echoes and expands AĀ II.3.5 as cited above: “Memory (*smara*) is more than Space (*ākāśa*, the medium of hearing). Accordingly, even were many men assembled, not being possessed of Memory, neither would they hear any one at all, nor think (*man*), nor recognize (*vijñā*), but if possessed of Memory, they would hear and think and recognize. By Memory, assuredly, one recognizes (*vijānāti*) children, recognizes cattle. Reverse Memory.”

The power-of-the-soul that remembers is the Mind (*manas* = *νοῦς*),⁸ undistracted by the working of the powers of perception and action. “There, in ‘clairvoyant-sleep’ (*svapne*)⁹ that divinity intuitively (*anubhavati*)

⁶ *Sarvānubhūh* states rather the basis than the bare fact of omniscience. The Self is necessarily “omniscient” because it is “the only seer, hearer, thinker, etc.” in us (BU III.4.2, III.7.23, etc.). The empirical self is its instrument.

⁷ *Enneads* IV.4.7. ⁸ Cf. MU VI.34.6-9.

⁹ *Svapna* here, as often elsewhere, is not ordinary sleep or dreaming, but a state of contemplation (*dhyāna*). The “divinity” is the “Recognitive Person” (*vijñānamaya puruṣa*) of BU II.1.17, 18, “who is said to be ‘asleep’ (*svapiti*) when he controls the

Greatness. Whatever has been seen (*dṛṣṭam*), he proximately sees (*anu-pāśya'*), whatever has been heard, he proximately hears (*anūśrunoti*). Whatever has been and has not been seen, whatever has been heard and has not been heard, intuitively known or unknown (*anubhūtam, ananubhūtam*), good or evil (*sat, asat*),¹⁰ whatever has been directly experienced (*pratyānubhūtam*) in any land or airt, again and again he directly experiences; he sees it all, he sees it all" (Prašna Up. iv.5); or, as the Commentator understands the conclusion, "being himself the all, he sees it all," in accordance with the principle of the identity of knowing and being enunciated in verse II, where the Comprehensor of the Self "knowing all, becomes all." In the foregoing context, Śaṅkara interprets, rightly I think, "seen and not seen" as referring to "what has been seen in this birth and what has been seen in another birth":¹¹ the meaning of this

powers of perception and action. Resuming the cognitive power (*viññānam ādāya*), he rests in the heart. . . . When he 'sleeps,' these worlds are his. . . . Controlling the powers of perception and action, he drives around in his own person (lit. 'body') as he will." As in BU v.3-7, where this Person "as it were contemplates (*dhyāyati*), as it were disports, for when he is 'asleep' (*svapno bhūtvā*) he transcends this world and the forms of death."

In this technical sense, "sleep" and "dreaming" are not the sleep of fatigue but the act of imagination. And this is quite universal. For example, "I will pour out my spirit upon all flesh . . . your old men shall dream dreams, your young men shall see visions" (Joel 2:28); "my thoughts had soared high aloft, while my bodily senses had been put under restraint by sleep—yet not such sleep as that of men weighed down by fullness of food or by bodily weariness—[and] methought there came to me a Being . . . the Mind of the Sovereignty . . . [who said] 'Keep in mind all that you desire to learn, and I will teach you,'" (Hermes, *Lib.* 1.1; in 1.28 he refers to the sleep of fatigue as "irrational sleep"); "Me bi-fel a ferly . . . I slumberde in a slepyng . . . benne gon I meeten a meruelous sweune . . . I beo-heold. . . ." (*Piers the Plowman*, Prologue). *Mathnawi* iv.3067 contrasts the sleep of the vulgar with that of the elect; the latter "has nothing in common with the sleep of ignorance (*khwab-i-ghafat*) in which most people pass their conscious lives" (Nicholson's note on *Mathnawi* 11.31, cf. 1.388-393; also BG 11.69 [and M 1.260]). Life is an "awakening" from nonexistence; "sleep" is an awakening from life.

What availeth me to sleep and wake?

If to sleep unsleeping the way is seen,

Ah, then I see it availeth me.

Tayamānavar (P. Arunachalam, "Luminous Sleep," reprinted from the *Westminster Review*, Colombo, 1903).

¹⁰ Lit. "aught and naught," and here "good and evil" rather than "real and unreal"; cf. *punyam ca pāpam ca* in BU iv.3-5 and *sadasat* in MU 11.1.

¹¹ "God enjoys eternalwise the contingency of things. . . . The knower being that which is known" (Meister Eckhart, Evans ed., I, 391, 394). "The mind of the Sage at rest becomes the mirror of the universe" (*Chuang-tzu*, p. 158).

will become clearer when we deal with *jātavedas* and *jātissaro* and if we bear in mind that though he speaks of former births, the Lord is for him "the only transmigrant."¹²

The subject of Memory is discussed in Mil 78-80. It is first shown that it is not by thinking (*citta*) but by Memory (*sati = smṛti*) that we remember; for we are not without intelligence even when what was done long ago has been forgotten (*pamuttam = pramṛṣṭam*). It is then asked, "Does Memory arise (*appajjati*) always as an over-knowledge state (*sabbā . . . abhijānāntā*)¹³ or is Memory factitious (*kaṭumikā = kṛtimā*), and answered that "Memory occurs as an over-knowledge state, and is also factitious," i.e., it may be either spontaneous or artificially stimulated.¹⁴ The king rejoins, "That amounts to saying that all Memory is over-knowing, never factitious." Nāgasena replies, "In that case, craftsmen would have no need of workshops or schools of art or science, and masters would be useless; which is not true." So the king asks, "In how many ways does Memory arise?" Nāgasena answers, "Sixteen."¹⁵ These are really only two ways, either by over-knowing without means (*abhijānato*), or by

¹² See Coomaraswamy, "On the One and Only Transmigrant" [in this volume—ed.].

¹³ *Abhi* in *abhijñā* intensifies *jñā*, to know (γινώσκω, νοέω, kennen, cunning): to remember is something more than simply to perceive; cf. Meister Eckhart's "I can see a rose in winter when no rose is there." Hence, while *abhijñā* can mean just "remember" or "understand" (Pāṇini 11.2.112, *abhijñāsi = smarasi, budhyase*; Mil 77, *abhijñāsi*, "Did you ever remember?"), in Pāli Buddhism generally the sense of the marvellous predominates, and *abhijñā = abhijānā* is usually the supernatural knowledge or omniscience of a Buddha, an *iddhi* acquired by contemplative discipline and which he or other Arhats can "intuit" (*anubhū*) at will. In this sense *abhijñā* includes the six powers of levitation (motion at will through the air), clairaudience, thought-reading, knowledge of one's own and of other people's former births, and assurance that liberation has been attained (D 11.281, based on many other contexts, PTS Dictionary, s.v.). It is noteworthy that "over-knowing" and "liberation" coincide, reminding one of Meister Eckhart's "Not till the soul knows all that there is to be known can she pass over to the unknown good."

Abhijñā does not appear in the Upaniṣads; in BG it is always only used of "knowing" Krishna—certainly an "over-knowing" and not an empirical experience. [Alternatively, one "remembers" Krishna, BG viii.5.]

¹⁴ The *Milindapañha* categories are not quite the same as those of the previously cited texts, in which *abhijñā* does not appear. But it is made very clear that all learning is really *re-cognition*, i.e., re-collection.

¹⁵ I.e., one *abhijānato* and the rest *kaṭumikā*. This must have something to do with the well-known doctrine of the "sixteen parts" of which the "Self" is the sixteenth (BU 1.5.15) and that part "with which you now understand (*anubhavaṣi*) the Vedas" (CU vi.7.6). [Cf. *The Gospel of Sri Ramakrishna*, tr. Swami Nikhilananda, New York, 1942, p. 367.] On the number "16," cf. E.J.H. MacKay, *Chunhu-Daro Excavations* (1935-1936), pp. 240-241 (*American Oriental Series*, Vol. 20, 1943).

external stimulation (*kaṭumikā*), the total of sixteen being made up by a subdivision of the second category according to the nature of the means. Thus Memory occurs by over-knowledge simply when such as Ānanda or others who are "birth-rememberers" (*jāṭissarā*)¹⁶ remember a birth (*jāṇim saranti*): it occurs factitiously when those who are naturally forgetful (*muttha-satiko = mṛṣṭa*)¹⁷ are constrained or stimulated to remember by another person (or thing), e.g., when one recognizes a relative by likeness, or cattle by their brands,¹⁸ or reads letters or numbers, or consults a book, or intuitively (*anubhūta*), as when one remembers what has already been seen or heard (without being "reminded" of it). Memory, in any case, is a latent power.

Thus what we think we "learn," but really "remember," implies that in intuition directly, and in learning indirectly, we are really drawing upon or, as the older texts would express it, "milking" an innate prescience (*prajñāna = πρόνοια, προμῆθεια*). In D 1.19-22 we are told that the gods fall from heaven only when their "memory fails, and they are of confused memory" (*sati mussati, satiyā sammosā*); those whose mind remains

¹⁶ This refers to the supernormal faculty of remembering past "habitations," as possessed by a Buddha or other Arhat, and is to be distinguished from the memory of a former habitation by an ordinary brother, whose memory of the past is included in the list of factitious rememberings because means are employed to evoke it. The supernormal power is exercised at will by a Buddha and extends to the recollection of any birth whatever, however remote; the brother who is not yet an Arhat can only, by a step-by-step procedure, recover the memory of one or more births, but no more (Vis 411): in the first case the all-seeing view is, as it were, from the center of a circle, whence all "moments" within or upon the circumference can be seen at a glance; the second case is that of a being whose range is naturally confined to motion along the circumference itself (i.e., in time, so far as memories are concerned), who cannot see forward or backward immediately but can only predict by inference or recover the past by successive steps—he can look inward by analogy, but has neither foresight nor hindsight nor insight, unless supranaturally and by inspiration. The Buddha has "prior knowledge of the ultimate beginning (*agaññam . . . pajānāmi*), and more than that" (D III.28); his range is infinite (*ananta-gocaram, Dh 179*); but it is as the Buddha, the Wake, not as this man Gotama, now waking and now sleeping, that he is thus omniscient (*sabbāññu = sarvajñā*), and similarly in the case of others. This amounts to saying that Buddha = Paramātman.

¹⁷ TS VII.6.10.4, *madya*, is glossed by *vimṛtyonmatta*, "oblivious," "in a state of amnesia." Sn 815, *mussati*, is explained by *nassati*, "perishes" (SnA 536); and *parimussati* is *paribāhīro hoti*, i.e., "wholly forgets" is to be "alienated" (Vis 44). I infer that amnesia was a known malady, and further that all forgetfulness was thought of as a madness of the same kind, only the Buddha and other Arhats being perfectly sane.

¹⁸ Cf. CU VII.13.1, "recognize cattle," cited above. On cattle brands see Pohath-Kehelpannala in *Ceylon National Review*, I (1907), 334, and John Abbott, *The Keys of Power* (New York, 1932), p. 140, and figs. 19-21 and 52.

uncontaminated, and do not forget, are "steadfast, immutable, eternal, of a nature that knows no change, and will remain so for ever and ever"; and such, likewise, is the liberated (*vimutto*) Buddha's prescience (*pajānanā*), or foreknowing, "on which, however, he lays no stress" (*taṃ ca pajānanam na parāmasati*).¹⁹ It is significant, in the first place, that what is thus said of the Buddha is, as so often happens, only a paraphrase of what has already been said of Agni, who "does not forget the prior nor the latter word, but is not vainglorious by reason of his counsel" (*na mṛṣyate prathamam nāparam vaco'sya kṛtvā sacate apradīpitaḥ*, RV I.145.2).²⁰ And secondly, that for Plato also it is precisely a failure to remember that drags down from the heights the soul that has walked with God (*θεῶν ξυνοπαδός = brahmacārī*) and had some vision of the truths,²¹ but cannot retain it (*Phaedrus* 248c, cf. Plotinus, IV.4.7 ff.).²²

¹⁹ I.e., *na parāmṛśati*, and rendered by Rhys Davids, "he is not puffed up"; in a similar context, D III.28, *na paramāsāmi* (cf. M I.433 for this word) is rendered by "I do not pervert it"—"I am not attached to it" might be better. That these are the right connotations seems to follow from the Vedic parallel cited above. It will be because his prescience is "of far more than that" (*tato ca uttarataritaram pajānāmi*, M I.433 and D III.28), rather than because such knowledge is not essential to liberation (M I.277), that it is not overvalued; there are other than cosmic possibilities.

On the distinctions of gnosis amongst the gods in the Brahma worlds, cf. A IV.74 ff.: some are content with its beatitudes, others are prescient (*pajānanti*) of an absolute liberation.

²⁰ Suggestive of Agni's epithet *satya-vāc*, "whose word is truth," RV III.26.9, VII.2.3; cf. Pāli: *sacca-vācā, sacca-vādīn*. "The flower and fruit of speech is truth" (AA II.2.6 [or "meaning," *Nirukṭa* I.10]). *Prathamam nāparam* may well mean "eternal" rather than "earlier and latter"; cf. BU II.5.19, *apūrvam anāparam = Paradise*, XXIX.20, *nē prima nē poscia*.

Agni, kṛtvā . . . apradīpitaḥ, contrasts with the Indra of BD 7.54, *svena vīryena darpitah*, until he is reawakened by Saptagu-Bṛhaspati = Agni and comes to himself again. The Sacerdotium is not intoxicated by knowledge, but the Regnum may be intoxicated by power.

²¹ Few retain an adequate memory of them (*Phaedrus* 250a).

²² The gods do not sometimes forget and sometimes remember—"such memory is for those who have lost it." The omniscience of Zeus does not depend on observation, but on the innate gnosis of his own unlimited life. Cf. Ibn 'Atā, "Openly the heart's eye then beholds him, and doth scorn remembrance, as a burden hardly to be borne," quoted by Abū Bakr, *Kitāb al Tāarruf*, ch. 47 [cf. *Paradiso* XXIX.79 ff.]. For Aristotle, too, the Divine Mind "does not remember," as does the perishable mind, which is reminded by its sense perceptions (*De anima* 3.5). "In the heart one knows the truth, in the heart alone, forsooth, is truth established" (BU III.9.23); the soul's recognition of the visions stored up in her is the process of "remembering" (*Enneads* IV.7.10, 12). When everything has been remembered, once and for all, then there is no more remembering as a process, but only an immemorial knowledge. The disparagement of memory will not, then, be misunderstood; one might say

No less striking is the fact that *mosā*, *musā* (*mṛṣā*), "false," is regularly opposed to *saccam* (*satyam*), "true"; and since this *musā*, *mṛṣā* derives from *musati*, *mṛṣ*, to "ignore," "forget," "overlook," it is clear that "not-true" coincides with "forgotten." In the same way, although conversely, *λήθη* is "oblivion," "forgetting," and *ἀληθεια* "truth," or literally "not-forgetting." Accordingly, *ὁ ἀληθὴς οὐρανός* (*Phaedo* 109E) is not merely "true, or real, heaven" but also "heaven where there is no forgetting," and where, by the same token, the gods "never learn" because there is nothing ever absent from their ken (Plotinus, iv.4.7); in the same way Plato's *τὸ ἀληθείας πεδίον* is not merely "plain of truth" but also "land of no forgetting," and the opposite of Aristophanes' *τὸ λήθης πεδίον*, "land of oblivion" (*The Frogs*, 186). *Lethe*, too, is one of Discord's deadly brood (Hesiod, *Theogony* 227), and still for Shakespeare means "death"; so that the "land of not-forgetting" is also the "land of immortality." In the sense that we are what we know, and that to be and to know are the same (*τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἔστιν τε καὶ εἶναι*),²³ recollection is life itself, and forgetfulness a lethal draught.

So far, it is clearly implied that Memory is a kind of latent knowledge,²⁴

that, like "consciousness" in the Buddhist parable of the Raft, remembering is "good for crossing over, but not an activity to be clung to." To remember is a virtue in those who have forgotten, but the perfected never lose their vision of the truth and have no need to recall it (*Phaedrus* 249cd, cf. Proclus as discussed in n. 25).

Sister M. P. Garvey, *St. Augustine, Christian or Neo-Platonist* (Milwaukee, Wis., 1939), (p. 107, confuses memory with remembering, as one might being with becoming. Memory, taken absolutely, coincides with omniscience and is not a procedure; but remembering is learning and would be a contradiction in one whose memory never fails. This is, in fact, Philo's distinction of memory (*μνήμη*) from recollection (*ἀνάμνησις*), the latter being a means of escape (*ἐκ λήθης*), but evidently needless as such on the part of one whose memory has never lapsed (*Legum allegoriae* III.91-93). This distinction, if I am not mistaken, is that of *smara* from *smarana*, the former denoting love as well as memory, and the latter the act of remembering, which implies a desiring or seeking rather than a loving.

²³ Hermann Diels, ed., *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* (Berlin, 1903), fr. 18a 5. Cf. MU VI.34-3, *vac cittaś tanmayo bhavati*, "What is one's thought, that he becomes," and St. Augustine, *Confessions* XIII.11, "esse, nosse, velle . . . in his tribus . . . et una vita mens et una essentia."

²⁴ "A fund of omniscience exists eternally in our heart" (*Mahāvairocana-bhīṣam-bodhi*, cited by R. Tajima from the *Taiśho* (Tripitaka, XVIII, 38c.20). This "fund" corresponds to the *Ālayavijñāna* ("Hoard of Discernment"), which is to be distinguished from all specific (singular) discernments, and identified with the "Compendious Providence" (*vijñāna-ghana*, *prajñāna-ghana*) of the Upaniṣads, and with the form of God's knowledge in Christian theology, where his knowledge of himself is his knowledge of all things. [Cf. *Enneads*, IV.7.10,12, on the "eternal science" latent within you.]

which may be either self-revealing or revived by an appropriate external sign, for example, when we are "taught," or more truly "re-minded." There is a clear distinction of mere perception from recognition, whether or not evoked by the percept. Memory is a re-recovery or re-experiencing (*pratyānubhū*, *Prāśna Up.* IV.5), and it may be observed that the other supernatural powers (*iddhi*) which can be experienced at will by the Arhat are similarly called "recoveries" (*pātihāra*, *√prati-hr*). It is evidently not, then, the outer, aesthetic self, but an inner and immanent power, higher than that of the senses, that remembers or foreknows (*prajñā*), by a "fore" knowledge that is rather "prior" with respect to all empirical means of knowing than merely "fore" with respect to future events—*unde non praevidentia sed providentia potius dicitur* (Boethius, *De consolazione philosophiae* v.669, 70). That which remembers, or rather which is always aware of all things, must be a principle always present to (*anubhū*) all things, and therefore itself unaffected by the duration in which these events succeed one another.²⁵ We are thus reduced to a Providence (*prajñā*, *πρόνοια*)²⁶ or Providential Self or Spirit (*prajñātman*) as the ultimate source on which all Memory draws, and with which

²⁵ "He knows, but it is not by means of anything other than himself that he knows," BU IV.5.15, etc. This is essentially also the Christian doctrine about the divine manner of knowing, cf. St. Thomas, *Sum. Theol.* I.14. [note Euripides, *Helēn*, 1015-1017.]

Cf. *Phaedrus* 247E ff., "Knowledge, but not such knowledge as has a beginning and varies as it is associated with (*ἐν . . . οὐσα* = *anubhavati*) the things we now call realities, but that has its being in the reality that is." The soul that can always hold this vision remains inviolable; but even of those who have seen it, "few are possessed of a consistent memory."

"Every God has an undivided knowledge of things divided and a timeless knowledge of things temporal; he knows the contingent without contingency, the mutable immutably, and in general all things in a higher mode than belongs to their station" (Proclus, *Elements of Theology* 124, cf. E. R. Dodds' ed., Oxford [reprinted 1963], p. 226). The gods of Proclus are, of course, the angels of Dionysius the Areopagite and of Christian theology in general.

²⁶ To employ the word "Providence" correctly, it must always be remembered that the foreknowing principle is that which gives being, and only indirectly a manner of being. It is much rather Fate (the operation of mediate causes, *karma*) that "allots" or "provides for" the being of things as they are, than Providence, which is the timeless witness of this operation. The divine foreknowing is not, as such, a transitive act, but the act of being, prior to all becomings, of which it knows because it is the only real subject in them all.

Thus in Dodds' Proclus, *Elements of Theology*, p. 126, "for which it (Providence) provides" should read "of which it is provident." Fate inheres in time, Providence is *ex tempore*, and these are as much to be distinguished as are mediate causes from a first cause. [Cicero, *De natura Deorum* II.xxix, confuses prudence and providence! St. Thomas, *Sum. Theol.* I.23.2: "Providence is not anything in the things provided for; but a type in the mind of the provider"—therefore, not fate.]

