



On the Indian and Traditional Psychology, or Rather Pneumatology

Ecce quomodo in cognitione sensitiva continatur occulte
divina sapientia, et quam mira est contemplatio quinque
sensuum spiritualium secundum conformitatem ad sensus
corporales.¹

St. Bonaventura, *De reductione arrium ad theologiam* 10

Ἄστρος αὐτὸ σῶμα θεραπεύει, τὰ ἑαυτοῦ ἄλλα ὄψ' ἀστρον θεραπεύει.²
Plato, *I Alcibiades* 131B.

As Jadunath Sinha, in the only extensive work on Indian psychology (*bhūta-vidyā*), remarks, "There is no empirical psychology in India. Indian psychology is based on metaphysics."³ The explanation of this is that

[Apparently written in 1943, this essay was rejected because of its length from the scholarly Festschrift to which it was contributed. Coomaraswamy seems to have made no further effort to publish this summary and extension of his late thought.—ED.]

¹ "Behold how the Divine Wisdom is secretly enclosed in sensitive perception, and how marvelous is the contemplation of the five spiritual senses in their conformity to the bodily senses." *Continatur occulte* = *guhā nihitam*; *sensus spirituales* = *jñānendriyani*; *sensus corporales* = *karmendriyani*.

² "One who serves the body, serves what is his, not what he is." In the same way, "One who only knows the body, knows what is the man's, but not the man himself" (*ibid.*, A).

³ Jadunath Sinha, *Indian Psychology: Perception* (London, 1934), p. 16. See also C.A.F. Rhys Davids, *Buddhist Psychology* (London, 1914); T. Stcherbatsky, *The Central Conception of Buddhism, and the Meaning of the Word "Dharma"* (London, 1923); and R. N. Dandekar, *Der vedische Mensch* (Heidelberg, 1938) (esp. pp. 21–24). Rhys Davids' book is very informative, but must be read with some caution, having been written "in ignorance of the stock of current nomenclature of which the Nikāyas made use" (p. 18). For this reason, perhaps, the author sees a contradiction between the Upaniṣad doctrine of the *Ātman* as "only seer," etc., and the Buddhist pronouncement that the question "Who sees?" cannot properly be asked; not realizing that the question is improper just because the "only seer"

"all Indian systems of philosophy are at the same time doctrines of salvation."⁴ In other words, Indian philosophers are not interested in the facts, or rather statistical probabilities, for their own sake, but primarily in a liberating truth.⁵ The traditional and sacred psychology takes for granted that life (*bhava*, *γένεσις*) is a means to an end beyond itself, not to be lived at all costs. The traditional psychology is not, in fact, based on observation; it is a science of subjective experience. Its truth is not of the kind that is susceptible of statistical demonstration; it is one that can only be verified by the expert contemplative.⁶ In other words, its truth can only be verified by those who adopt the procedure prescribed by its proponents, and that is called a "Way." In this respect it resembles the truth of facts, but with this difference, that the Way must be followed by every individual for himself; there can be no public "proof." By verification we mean, of course, an ascertainment and experience, and not such a persuasion as may result from a merely logical understanding. Hence there can be no "propaganda" on behalf of the sacred science. Our only endeavor in the present article will be to expound it. Essentially, the sacred science is one of qualities, and the profane a science of quantities. Between these sciences there can be no conflict but only a difference, however great. We can hardly describe this difference better than in Plato's words cited above, or than in those of Kaṣ. Up. III.8, "Action (*karma*) is not what one should try to understand, what one should know is the Agent. Pleasure and pain are not what one should try to understand, what one should know is their Discriminant," and so on for the other factors of experience. We are careful not to say "of our experience," for it cannot by any means

never becomes anyone and is not any "who" or what. Seen in this light, the opposition of Brahmanical "realism" to Buddhist "nominalism" loses all its force (cf. n. 51).

⁴ T. Stecherbatsky, *Buddhist Logic* (Leningrad, 1932), p. 195. In the same way, Plato's is a moral philosophy—*Bildung* rather than *Wissenschaft*, no "mere" theory, but also a way of life (cf. *Phaedo* 64ff.), a *marga* = *tynevois*, as, e.g., in *Phaedrus* 253A.

⁵ Cf. Franklin Edgerton, "The Upaniṣads: What Do They Seek and Why?" *JAOS*, XLIX (1929), 102.

⁶ Cf. Plato, *Phaedo* 65a: "the Soul attains to Truth . . . best when none of these things, neither hearing nor seeing, nor pain nor any pleasure troubles it, and it is, as far as possible, all alone by itself (*αὐτῆ κατ' αὐτὴν γένηται*)." Note that "all alone by oneself" is not a phrase to be taken lightly, whether in English or Greek; it implies the distinction of the two selves, and the companionship of self with Self, that "other who never absconds" and to whom if one resorts he is "never alone" (BU II.1.11); cf. Manu, VI.49, *āmananava saḥāyena*; and A v.90, *kaḥyāna . . . saḥāya*.

be assumed with safety that *we* are the Agent and Discriminant, nor safely argued *cogito ergo sum*.

It may be objected that the application of both the empirical and the metaphysical psychologies is to a salvation; and this can be granted, in view of the fact that *salvation* imports a kind of health. But it does not follow that we must, on this ground alone, choose between them as a means to that end; for the simple reason that "salvation" means different things in the different contexts. The health envisaged by the empirical psychotherapy is a freedom from particular pathological conditions; that envisaged by the other is a freedom from all conditions and predicaments, a freedom from the infection of mortality and to be as, when and where we will (TU III.10.5; John 10:9, etc.). Furthermore, the pursuit of the greater freedom necessarily involves the attainment of the lesser; psycho-physical health being a manifestation and consequence of spiritual well-being (Śvet. Up. II.12, 13). So whereas the empirical science is only concerned with the man himself "in search of a soul," the metaphysical science is concerned with this self's immortal Self, the Soul of the soul. This Self or Person is not a personality, and can never become an object of knowledge,⁸ but is always its substance; it is the living, spirant principle in every psycho-hylic individuality "down to the ants" (AĀ 1.3.8) and, in fact, the "only transmigrant" in all transmigrations and evolutions. Hence we call the traditional psychology a pneumatology rather than a science of the "soul." And because its Self "never became anyone" (KU II.18), the metaphysical science is fundamentally one of "self-naughting"; as in Mark 8:34, *si quis vult post me sequi, denegat seipsum*.¹⁰ In what follows we shall take for granted the distinction of "soul" (*ψυχή*, *nephesh*,

⁷ C. G. Jung, *Modern Man in Search of a Soul* (London, 1933). Jung frankly admits, "I restrict myself to what can be psychically experienced, and repudiate the metaphysical" (R. Wilhelm and C. G. Jung, *The Secret of the Golden Flower*, New York, 1931, p. 135). Such a "restricted" approach becomes a "Taoism without Tao" (cf. André Prêtre, *La Fleur d'or et le taoïsme sans Tao*, Paris, 1931) or Brahmanā without Brahma, and cannot be taken seriously as a scientific account of any traditional psychology.

⁸ "Whereby (*kena*, by what, as whom) might one discriminate the Discriminator?" (BU II.4.14, IV.5.15).

⁹ Śaṅkarācārya, BrSBh I.1.5, *neśvarād anyath samānti*; i.e., Plato's Soul that "is co-extended (*συνεταρμύειν*, cf. n. 75) now with one body, now with another" (*Laws* 903b), as in Śvet. Up. v.10, "whatever body he assumes, therewith is he united (*yuyūate*)," and BG XIII.26, "whatsoever is born is from the conjunction (*samyogāt*) of the Knower of the Field with the Field."

¹⁰ Cf. Coomaraswamy, "Ākṣmaññā; Self-naughting" [in this volume—ed.]

śarīra ātman) from "spirit" (πνεῦμα, ψυχῆς ψυχῆ, ruah, āsarīra ātman) implied in the customary printing of "self" with a small "s" and "Self" with the capital.

Our human self is an association (*sambhūtiḥ*, συγγένεια, συνονοσία, κοινωσία) of breaths or spirations (*prāṇāḥ*, αἰσθησεις, JUB IV.7.4, cf. II.4.5), or troop-of-elemental-beings (*bhūtāgana*); and as such an "elemental-self" (*bhūtātman*) to be distinguished logically but not really from "its immortal Self and Duke" (*net*¹¹ = ἡγεμών), immanent Agent (*kartr*) and Giver-of-being (*prabhūḥ*, MU III.2, 3, IV.2, 3, VI.7), the "Inner Man of these elemental-beings" (*bhūtānām antaḥ puruṣaḥ*, AA III.2.4); these two selves being the passible and impassible natures of a single essence. The "elemental beings" (*bhūtāḥ*, *bhūāni*) are so called with reference to the Being or Great Being (*mahābhūtaḥ*), Brahma, Self (*ātman*), Person (*puruṣaḥ*), or Breath (*prāṇaḥ*), Prajāpati, Agni or Indra, etc.¹² from whom or which all these "our" powers of expression, perception, thought, and action¹³ have come forth as spirations or "breaths" (*prāṇaḥ*) or "rays" = "reins" (*raśmayāḥ*), BU II.1.26, II.4.12, IV.5.11; MU VI.32, etc. The designation "Being" (*bhūtaḥ*, more literally "has-become")¹⁴ is "because-of-coming-forth" (*udbhūtatvat*) of the One who makes himself many (MU

¹¹ From *nī*, to lead. *Prāṇaḥ* is properly from *pra-an*, to breathe forth, but is also connected hermeneutically with *pra-nī*, to lead forth, in a metaphor closely connected with irrigation, as in RV II.12.7, where Indra is *apāṇaḥ neti*, and in JUB I.58.4.

¹² The names of God are given, as repeatedly stated in Indian texts from RV onwards (as also in other theologies), according to the aspect under which he is considered, or power that he exerts; and because of his omniformity (as Viśvarūpaḥ) and universal creativity (as Viśvakarmā) there can be no end to the names. From RV onwards the procedure from aspect to aspect and function to function is a "becoming" (√ *bhū*); for example, "Thou, Agni, art Varuṇa in being born, and when kindled [born], becomest (*bhavas*) Mitra," RV V.3.1. We retain the various names in their contexts; but the reader, from the present point of view, need only think of these names as those of "God" as the First Principle of all things.

¹³ One, two, three, five, seven, nine, ten, or indefinitely numerous (cf. JUB II.6, etc.).

¹⁴ This is the true sense of "I am" in Exod. 3:14, where *ehyē* = *bhavāmi* (cf. D. B. Macdonald, *The Hebrew Philosophical Genius*, Princeton, 1934, p. 18); similarly Egyptian *khefr*. However, Macdonald (Ike C.A.F. Rhys Davids in *To Become or Not To Become*, London, 1937) does not see that becoming is not a contradiction of being but the epiphany of being, or that what can "become" represents only a part of the possibility inherent in the Being that "becomes." God becomes *what* he becomes "to mortal worshippers" (RV V.3.2), but in himself is "what?" (*kaḥ*), i.e., not any "what" and "where?" i.e., not "anywhere."

v.2).¹⁵ The powers of the soul thus extended by the Prabhūḥ and Vibhūḥ are accordingly called "distributive essences (*vibhūṭayāḥ*)."¹⁶ The operation of these powers in us is what we call our consciousness (*caitanyaṃ*, *samjñānam*, *vijñānam*), i.e., conscious life in terms of subject and object. This consciousness, with which all ethical responsibility is bound up, arises at our birth and ceases when "we" die (BU IV.4.12-14, Eccl. 9:5); but this consciousness and its correlated responsibility are only particular modes of being, not ends in themselves, but means to an end beyond themselves.¹⁷ Our life, with all its powers, is a gift (AV II.17) or loan (*Mathnawī* 1.245).

So "He who giveth-selfhood (*ya ātmadā* = *prabhū*)¹⁸ becometh sole king of the moving-world . . . becometh overlord of elemental-beings (*bhūtānām adhipatir babhūva*);¹⁹ and when he takes up his stand

¹⁵ *Udbhū*, to come forth, i.e., be manifested, is the opposite of *nirbhū*, to abscond, disappear; as *pravrt*, to extrovert (intrans.), is the contrary of *nivrt*, to introvert. *Udbhūtatva* = *prapadana* is precisely, in the theological sense, "procession."

It is important to bear in mind that *bhūta* is not primarily (but sometimes by analogy) any such "being" as ourselves, who are not one being or power, but a composite of cooperative beings or powers, rather to be regarded as "Intelligences" or "Angels" than as human beings. God is the "only seer, hearer, thinker, etc." in us (BU III.8.23, etc.); it is He that takes birth in every womb and that "indwelling the secret cave [of the 'heart'] looks round about through these elemental beings (*guhām pravṣiṣya bhūtebhīr vyapasyata*, KU IV.6)," of which "we" are a "troop"; we are his "lookouts." Our "being" is not our own, and not in fact a being, but a becoming (*bhava*, *yéveas*), as is admirably stated in strictly traditional terms by Plutarch, *Moralia* 392 (*guhām pravṣiṣya* = *occulte immanetur*) and Plato, *Symposium* 207DE.

¹⁶ In AA II.1.7 and BG X.40, described as "powers"; and in RV I.166.11, what amounts to the same thing (as will later appear), Maruts, *vibhūvo vibhūyayāḥ*.

It is by this distributive becoming (*vibhūta*, *vibhūti-yoga*) that the Self is omnipresent (*sarvagataḥ*, Svet. Up. III.21, cf. *Prāśna* Up. III.12, *Īśā* Up. IV) and by the same token omniscient (MU VI.7) or synoptic (*vimanā* . . . *samdr̥k*, RV X.82.2; cf. *Nirūkta* X.26), and providential (*prajñāḥ*) in that its whole experience is *ex tempore*, no more dated than it is placed. All this is the basis of the Indian and Platonic doctrines of Recollection and Providence, and inseparable from that of the Only Transmigrant.

¹⁷ Cf. Coomaraswamy, *Hinduism and Buddhism*, 1943, n. 249.

¹⁸ "One as he is there, and many as he is in his children here" (SB X.5.2.16; cf. BG XIII.27, 30 and Plotinus, *Enneads* IV.4.2), i.e., "rays"; cf. n.25.

On the gift of selfhood see Coomaraswamy, "The Sunkiss," 1940, esp. p. 47, citing SB VII.3.2.12 (where it is because the Sun, Prajāpati, "kisses," i.e., breathes down upon, his children that each can say: "I am." So Dante, *Paradiso* XXIX.13-15, "perché suo splendore potesse, risplendendo, dir: Subisto"; and Rūmī, *Mathnawī* I:2197, "For this 'I-hood' comes to me from Him moment by moment").

¹⁹ The usual gnomic aorist; "has become" = "is become," *bhūtam*. The psychology that we called a *bhūta-vibhū* is the understanding of things, in the Buddhist phrase *yathā-bhūtaṃ*, "as become" (M I.260, etc.).

(*atīṣṭhantam*),²⁰ all [these gods] equip (*abhūsan*) him; putting on the kingdom-the-power-and-the-glory (*śrīyam vasānāḥ*), he proceeds (*carati*), self-illuminate. . . Unto him, the great [Brahma-] Daimon (*yaḅṣam*)²¹ in the midst of the world-of-beings, the supports-of-the-realm bring tribute (*balīm rāṣṭrabhṛto bhavanti*).²² . . . And even as his retainers attend upon a king when he arrives, even so all these elemental-beings (*sarvāni bhū-tāni*) prepare for him, crying, 'Here comes Brahma!' and just as men surround a king when he is setting out on a journey, so, when the time has come, all these breaths (*prāṇāḥ*) gather about the Self (*ātmānam . . . abhisamayanti*) when This-one [Brahma] aspires"²³ (RV x.121.2; AV IV.2.1, 2; AV IV.8.1, 3; AV x.8.15; BU IV.3.37, 38).

The nature of this divine procession in Person,²⁴ the relation of the

²⁰ "Takes up his stand here" (*ā-sthā, adhi-sthā*), is the regular expression for the "mounting" of the bodily vehicle by its spiritual passenger (CU VIII.12.1; Svet. Up. IV.11; BG xv.9, etc.). When he takes up a stand here he is no longer *svasthāḥ* but now with a "support" (*pratiṣṭhā, adhiṣṭhāna*), until he returns to himself.

²¹ The Brahma-Yakṣa, proceeding as Person (Puruṣa), who lies (*śete*) in the heart as the Overlord of Beings (*bhūtvādhipati*), and "to whom, as he lies (*śayanāye*), these deities bring tribute" (*balīm havanti*, JUB IV.20.11-23.7 ff., with BU IV.4.22). See also Coomaraswamy, "The Yakṣa of the Vedas and Upanisads," 1938.

Puruṣa is interpreted by *pur* = *πόλις* combined with *ai* = *κῆμα* (√ *ket*, also in *castra* and *civis*), and denotes, accordingly, "the Citizen in every city" (BU II.5.18; cf. AV x.2.28, 30, ŚB XIII.6.2.1). Our heart is the true "city of God" (*brahma-pura*, CU VIII.1-5), which is the same as to say that "the kingdom of God is within you." This is essentially the Platonic doctrine of man as a city or body-politic (*Republic*, and *passim*), and Philo's, whose *μόνος κυριος ο θεος πολιτης εστι (De cherubim 121)*, is virtually a translation of *sa vā ayam puruṣaḥ sarvānu pūrsu puruṣayaḥ* (BU II.5.8, as above); cf. Philo, *De opificio mundi* 142, where Adam (not "this man" but the Man) is called "the only citizen of the world" (*μόνος κοσμοπολιτης*). It is only on such a basis as this that a salutary civilization can be established or any sound political economy founded. "The city can never otherwise be happy unless it is drawn by those painters who follow the divine original" (*Republic 500b*).

²² The delegated powers are, precisely, his "attributes" (*ābharaṇāni*) and "ornaments" (*bhūṣanāni*), the original sense of both words being that of "equipment"; cf. Coomaraswamy, "Ornament" (in Vol. I of this edition—EN). The king's retainers (*bhūāḥ, vibhūāyāḥ, prāṇāḥ*, etc.) are his "adornment" (*bhūṣaṇam, √ bhū*), and that quite literally, not only a "wall" but also a "crown", namely of "glory," as we shall see in connection with the word *śrī*—the glory that he "wears" (*śrīyam vasūnāḥ*), "he upon whose head the Acons are a crown, darting forth rays" (*ākrīves, Coptic Gnostic Treatise XI*), "who wears the cosmos as his crown" (Hermes, *Lib. xv.7*; cf. n. 52).

²³ I.e., when "the Spirit returns to God who gave it" (Ecd. 12:7) and we "give up the ghost," the Holy Ghost.

²⁴ *ĀĀ II.2.1, lokam abhyarcat puruṣa-rūpeṇa . . . prāṇāḥ*; JUB IV.24.1, *puruṣam eva prapadanāyā vṛṇīta*. Cf. n. 21.

One to the Many,²⁵ and the origination of our consciousness and mobility are nowhere more clearly formulated than in MU II.6 ff. Here the intellectualizing Person (*manomayah puruṣaḥ*,²⁶ cf. Muṇḍ. Up. II.2.7), Prajāpati, the Progenitor (the Breath, AV XI.4.11), awakening as if from sleep, divides himself fivefold,²⁷ to awaken (*praitobodhanāya*) his lifeless offspring. "He, having still unattained ends (*akṛtārthah*),²⁸ from within

²⁵ "One as he is there, and many as he is in his children here" (SB x.5.2.16, cf. BG XIII.27, 30 and Plotinus, *Enneads* IV.4.2), i.e., "rays," for the Sun's rays are his sons (JUB II.9.10). Thus he is "bodiless in bodies" (KU II.22), "undivided in his divisions . . . in elemental beings" (BG XVII.20, XIII.16): 'Ο ἀσώματος, οὐτος ὁ πῶλοσώματος, μάλλον δὲ παντοσώματος (Hermes, *Lib. v.10A*).

²⁶ One and the same Person may be considered ontologically from more than one point of view or level of reference. In a threefold arrangement he is, (1) the Person in the eye, or heart, (2) the Person in the Sun, and (3) the Person in Lightning; these Persons assuming the "sheaths," respectively vegetative (*anna-maya*), intellectual (*manomaya*), and beatific (*ānanda-maya*), in accordance with which the personal Brahma is "existent-intelligent-beatific (*sac-tid-ānanda*)" and logically differentiated from the impersonal, "nonexistent (*asat*)" Brahma, though no real distinctions can be made in the Supreme Identity of "That One (*taḍ ekaṃ*)" that is both "existent and nonexistent (*sad-asat*)." These two are Meister Eckhart's "God" and "Godhead," and, as he says, "you must know what God and Godhead are"; he uses the expression, "free as the Godhead in its nonexistence," and says that "where these two abysses hang, equally spirated, despirated, there is the Supreme Essence." It will be understood that our affirmative psychology (pneumatology) as such, like the affirmative theology with which it really coincides, is with reference to "God" as Being (*ens simpliciter*), while the negative psychology, which proceeds by way of remotion (*negi, negi, na me so atā*) to a residual but ineffable Self, is not thus limited as to its end but extends to the absolute unity (*ekātvaṃ*) or aloneness (*kevalatvaṃ*) that transcends the distinction of natures (KU III.11; MU IV.6, VI.21; BG XV.16, 17; etc.).

²⁷ There are many ways in which the division is fivefold (cf. *ĀĀ I.3.8*; Svet. Up. I.5 ff.), among which the five senses or powers are here primarily intended; cf. BU IV.4.17, Praśna Up. III.12. The Atmavādins (autologists) maintain that the "Five Races" (*pañca-janāḥ*) are those of speech, hearing, sight, mind, and breath (of the nostrils) (BD VII.67), as must be the case in RV III.37.9, where Indra's powers (*indriyāni*) are "in the Five Races" (cf. RV I.176.5, v.32.11, v.35.2). But this is not the only meaning of the terms, and speaking more generally, God divides himself indefinitely (BU II.5.19, MU v.2) to fill these worlds, "with only a part of himself, as it were" (MU VI.26, BG XV.7): part "as it were," because the Spirit remains a total presence "undivided in the divided beings" (*avibhaktam ca bhūteṣu . . . vibhaktam*, BG XIII.16, XVIII.20); "no part of what is divine is cut off or separated, but only extends itself" (*ekrēveta* [= *utante*], Philo, *Deerius* 90).

²⁸ It will be seen that unrealized potentialities are the occasion of the Self's embodiment and apparent bondage; when Prajāpati has entered into his children fondly, he cannot extricate himself without their help (TS V.5.2.1; SB I.6.3.35, 36) —a conception with this profound implication, that "our" liberation is also and more truly *his* liberation. With the state of the "bird in the net, or cage," self-fettered by its own desires (MU III.2, S I.44; *Phaedo* 83a; *Mathnawī* I.1541), is to

the heart considered, 'Let me eat'²⁹ of sense objects (*arthān āśnāmi*).³⁰ Thereupon breaking through these apertures (*kāhānimāni bhūtvā*)³⁰ and

be contrasted the liberty of the Self "whose ends have been attained" (*ḥṛtārthah*, Svet. Up. II.14)—this is the state of the Marut, Bṛhadratha, who, "having done what there was to do" (*ḥṛtākṛtyāh*, MU VI.30, AA II.5; equivalent to *ḥārma ḥṛtvā* in TS I.8.3.1, and to *ḥataḥkaramiṣyam* in the Buddhist Arhant formula), "goes home" (*astam prāṇi*, TS I.8.3.1); his state whose desires are attained, who has no desire (*akāmaḥ*) and is self-sufficient (BU IV.4.6.7, IV.3.21, etc.), for whom there are no longer any ends to be attained by action (*naiva tasya ḥṛtenārthah*, BG III.18) and who can say, "there is nothing I needs must do" (BG III.22), and is thus liberated from all *necessitates coactionis, conditionati, ex fine*.

In all these contexts the "work to be done" (*ḥṛtya, ḥṛya, ḥaranīya*) is always, of course, in some sense sacrificial (*ḥārma ḥṛ = operare = sacra facere*).

²⁹ "Food" (*anna, bhoga, āhāra*) must not be understood in any restricted sense, but is whatever nourishes any continuing existence; food is life's fuel, whether physical or mental (cf. MU VI.11, M 1.260, and *Phaedrus* 246E ff.). Our life is a combustion. The Sun "rises up on food (*annena atī rohati*, RV x.90.2)," i.e., "comes eating and drinking" (Matr. II.19), and it is the same solar Fire that "eats food in the heart" (MU VI.1), by means of his "rays" (MU VI.12), so that "whoever eats (lives), it is by his ray that he eats" (JUB 1.29.6). Of the two selves or natures, "one eats the sweet fruit of the tree" (*pippalam svādu atī*, RV I.164.20; Mund. Up. III.1, Svet. Up. IV.6), like Eve and Adam in Genesis, and suffers accordingly. In other words, of the conjoint pair (*asyujā saḥkṛyā*), so often represented in the iconography as one bird with two heads, one eats "poison" (*viṣam*), the other "ambrosia" (*amṛitam*, cf. the *Pañcātāntara*, HOS, Vol. II, p. 127, and Anton Schiefner, tr., *Tibetan Tales*, London, 1924). In this connection it is significant that *Viṣ*, to "set," "work," "serve," gives rise equally to *viṣam*, poison, and *viśaya*, object of sense perception. On these considerations depends the theory of continence (again, in no restricted sense of the word); the withholding of their fuel from life's fires (MU VI.34.1, with its Buddhist equivalents, and as in Philo, *De specialibus legibus* IV.118, *ἡφαίμων, καθάπερ ὕλην πυρός, σβέσιν τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ἀπεργάζεσθαι*) being in order to conquer hunger (TS II.4.12.5), i.e., death (BU I.2.1), by fasting.

In this broader sense of the words, which includes, for example, "the love of fine colors and sounds" (*Republic* 476), the majority, even of those who lay claim to "culture," really "lives to eat," not realizing that, as was so well said by Eric Gill, "a good taste is a mortified taste"—not an appetite for all sorts of food. The kinds must be chosen according to the part of our soul that we propose to nourish most; cf. *Phaedrus* 246E.

³⁰ *Kāhāni*, the "doors of the senses" (*dvarāṇi*, BG VIII.12) = τὸ τῶν αἰσθησέων ὀρώμα (Philo, *De terius* 100) = ἄλκμα, of which *vois* is the *πυλωρός* (Hermes, *Lit.* 1.22, cf. v.6). *Kāhāni*, pl. of *ḥā* (also *ḥā*), are such openings as connect one "space" with another, hence passages that lead from the within to the without, and collectively one *ḥā* is "Varuṇa's Fount of Order" (*ḥāim tasya*, RV II.28.5). From *ḥā* derive *sukha* and *duḥkha*, weal and woe. *Rta* (cf. "rite") is *κόσμος* as Order: the Rivers pour out Order (*ṛtam arsanī stndhavaḥ*, RV I.105.2) and are of the nature of Order, and acquainted with Order (*arsanī ṛtavāṇi*, RV IV.18.6, *ṛtājāh*, IV.19.7; cf. *Enneads* II.8.10, "Imagine a spring that has no source outside itself; it gives itself to all the rivers, yet is never exhausted by what they take, but itself remains integrally what it always was; the tides that proceed from it are at one

going forth, with five rays (*raśmibhiḥ*)³¹ he eats of sense objects (*viśayān atti*): these cognitive powers (*buddhindriyāni = prañāni, prajñā-mātrā, tan-mātrā*, intelligences) are his 'rays,' the organs of action (*ḥarmanendriyāni*) are his steeds,³² the body is his chariot, mind (*manas = νοῦς*) is their Governor (*niyantṛ*),³³ his nature (*prakṛti = φύσις*)³⁴ the whip; impelled by him as its only energizer, this body spins like the potter's wheel,³⁵ impelled by him alone is this body set up in a state-of-conscious-

ness within it before they run their several ways, yet all, in some sense, know beforehand down what channels they will pour their streams").

³¹ These "rays," which are also the "reins" by which the steeds are yoked to the Mind, are those of St. Bonaventura's *lumen cognitionis sensitivae*, which acts in combination with the five corresponding elements, sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch in ourselves (*De reductione artium ad theologiam* 3, based on St. Augustine, *De genesi ad litteram*, c. 4, n. 6), the distinction of *lux, lumen*, and *color* (as percipient, means, and object of perception) being taken for granted: "ipsa divina veritas est lux, et ipsius expressiones respecter rerum sunt quasi luminosae irradiationes, licet intrinsecas, qua determinata educunt et dirigunt in ad quod exprimitur" (St. Bonaventura, *De scientia Dei* 3c). Cf. Rūmi, *Māḥnawī* 1.3268, 3273, 3275, "Through my beams thou hast come to life for a day or two. . . . The beams of the Spirit are speech and eye and ear. . . . The heart . . . has pulled the reins of the five senses"; Hermes, *Lit.* x.228, θεοῦ καθάπερ ἀκτῖνες αἱ ἐνέργουαι; and Plotinus, *Enneads* VI.4.3, where οἷον βολάς (ἡλαοῦ) = καθάπερ ἀκτῖνες θεοῦ. Cf. n. 59.

³² "Yoked are his thousand steeds" (RV VI.47.18), Indra's ten thousand steeds, rays of the Sun (JUB 1.44.1-5); tens of thousands substantial with their source (BU II.5.19), who is at once the knower, means of knowing, and the known.

³³ Mind is the prism by which the Light of lights (RV I.113.1, etc.) is refracted, and in which, conversely, its spectra are reunited. The Mind is twofold, pure or impure according to whether or not it is affected by its perceptions, whence the necessity of a *ḥatharisis (śuddha ḥarāna)* if we are to know the truth, as distinguished from opinion; on the two minds, and the sense of *μετάνοια*, see Coomaraswamy, "On Being in One's Right Mind," 1942.

Mind is the *niyantṛ* (coachman, *ḥyam*, as in *ḥya*), but is itself curbed by the ultimate Controller (*antaryāmin*, BU III.7; *niyantṛ*, MU VI.19, 30, cf. KU III.9). The Mind that has ends in view may be unable or unwilling to control the horses, which may or may not be unruly.

The ultimate Controller (*antaryāmin*), immanent deity, synteresis and "conscience," is the Socratic Daimon "that always holds me back from what 'I want to do'" (Plato, *Apology* 31D): Socrates thinks it "very fine to be opposed thus," but the man whom his desires constrain is only "angered by the voice from the Acropolis that says 'Thou shalt not'" (*Republic* 440a, with *Tirmachus* 70A); resents, in other words, his "inhibitions," and "kicks against the pricks."

³⁴ *Prakṛti* as the stimulant (not the "inspirer") of action, BG II.27, 33.

³⁵ *Sūryasya cakram*, RV V.29.10; *deva-cakram*, AB IV.15; *brahma-cakram*, Svet. Up. I.6; *samsara-cakram*, MU VI.28; Pāli Buddhist *bhava-cakkaṃ = ὁ τροχός τῆς γενέσεως*, James 3:6 (the last more likely of Orphic than Indian origin).

Nichts ist, das dich bewegt, du selber bist das Rad,
Das aus sich selbst läuft, und keine Ruhe hat.

