

WHAT ARE SEEMINGS?

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ABSTRACT

We are all familiar with the phenomenon of a proposition seeming true. Many think that these seeming states can yield justified beliefs. Very few have seriously explored what these seeming states are. I argue that seeming states are not plausibly analyzed in terms of beliefs, partial beliefs, attractions to believe, or inclinations to believe. Given that the main candidates for analyzing seeming states are unsatisfactory, I argue for a brute view of seemings that treats seeming states as irreducible propositional attitudes.

Most of us are familiar with the phenomenon of a proposition seeming true. It seems that it would be wrong to torture a baby. A few months ago, I saw a video of some men decapitating another man. What they did seemed wrong to me. Recently, several musicians got together to raise money for AIDS research. It seems to me that they did something good.

There are also a variety of non-moral cases. Proofs and arguments sometimes seem valid. Certain logical principles seem true. It seems that the light is coming from behind the person in this photograph. It seems that there is someone downstairs. It seems that the stick is bent.

We are all familiar with seeming states. One interesting question is whether or not these seemings have any epistemic value. Can seeming states make it rational to believe the propositions that are their contents? Does the fact that it seems that modus ponens is valid give me any positive reason what so ever to believe that modus ponens is valid?

This is a very interesting question in epistemology, and it has recently received increased attention in the literature.¹

Despite the recent attention to the epistemic question, very little attention has been devoted to what seemings are. If these mental states are going to play such a crucial role in philosophy, it would be good to know what they are. What I will argue in this paper may not be very helpful. I am going to argue that seemings are irreducible propositional attitudes.

I am not alone in this belief. Although he does not discuss the nature of seemings at any length, George Bealer does mention that he thinks we should treat them as irreducible.

When you first consider one of de Morgan's laws, often it neither seems true nor seems false; after a moment's reflection, however, something happens: it now just seems true. . . intuition (this type of seeming) is a sui generic, irreducible, natural (i.e., non-Cambridge-like) propositional attitude that occurs episodically.²

According to Bealer, we can go no further. There is something that it is like for a proposition to seem true, and we cannot analyze this seeming state in terms of other features of our psychology. I agree with Bealer, but a brute view about anything ought to be a philosophical last resort. In what follows, I will consider what I take to be the main candidate analyses of seemings, and I will argue that they are all unsatisfactory.

I. Seemings as Beliefs

One obvious candidate for analyzing seemings would be to analyze them in terms of belief or partial belief. Consider (S1).

(S1) It seems to S that P if, and only if, S believes P.

¹ Michael Huemer (2001), (2006), and (forthcoming). See also Markie (2005), (2006) and Steup (2004).

² George Bealer (1998), p. 207.

This will not do. A strong seeming could be outweighed by evidence to the contrary. The evidence doesn't eliminate the seeming, but it is enough for a person to suspend judgment and not believe the proposition.

Suppose Pat knew that a certain popular clothing brand made clothes using child sweatshop labor. He then sees his friend (who knows about the sweatshop labor) buy some clothing from that store. Suppose it seems to Pat that what his friend did was wrong. Further suppose that Pat had some evidence supporting the conclusion that refraining from buying clothing is not a productive way to make the lives of sweatshop laborers better and that boycotting clothing can hurt those in sweatshops more than help them. Suppose this evidence was enough for Pat to suspend judgment about whether or not his friend had done something wrong, despite the fact that what he did seemed wrong. Here we have a case where something seems true, but is not believed.

Proponents of (S1) might simply resist and say that Pat does believe that what his friend did was wrong, but we can add to the case that a number of items are absent that one typically associates with belief. For example, there seems to be a connection between sincere assertion and belief. Suppose Pat sincerely asserts "I do not believe that what my friend did was wrong" According to the plausible thesis that there is a connection between sincere assertion and belief, Pat believes that he does not believe that what his friend did is wrong. In this case, proponents of (S1) would have to say that Pat is mistaken about what his beliefs are. It is surely possible to be mistaken about what one believes in a case like this, but surely this is good prima facie reason for thinking that it is possible for a proposition to seem true and yet fail to believe that proposition. This case is certainly not decisive, but I think it does count against (S1).

Another reason it would be odd to regard Pat's *seeming* as a belief, is that when we describe the case as an instance where it merely seems true to Pat that something is true (but he regards himself as not believing), he doesn't seem to be the proper subject of criticism if his overall evidence doesn't support the proposition in question. If, however, he were to believe the proposition - we'd say he would be the proper subject of criticism if his evidence didn't support the proposition. In the case above Pat's *seeming* does not seem to be the proper subject of epistemic criticism. If he were to believe the proposition, then we would find it appropriate to assess Pat's belief with respect to whether or not his evidence supported that belief. Since beliefs can be criticized in a way that seeming states aren't, we have further reason to think that seemings are not beliefs.

Simpler counter examples to (S1) involving perception come from Michael Huemer. When I see a stick placed in the water, it will seem to me that the stick is bent. However, I won't believe that the stick is bent.³

One could argue that the above cases involve *partial belief*. One might argue that Pat partially believes that what his friend did is wrong. And that I partially believe that the stick is bent. This suggests the following analysis of *seems*.

(S2) It seems to S that P if, and only if, S believes P *to some degree*.

However, there are cases that seem to suggest that even this is false. I think Huemer's perceptual case still works well against (S2). I don't think I even partially believe that the stick is bent when I see it submerged in water. If you're not convinced, consider another example. Suppose you're out golfing. The sun is setting and you hold your golf ball up to the sunset. It might seem to you that the golf ball is about the size of the sun, but surely

³ Huemer (2001), p. 71

you don't believe *even partially* that the golf ball is the size of the sun.⁴ Ultimately, I don't see much hope for an analysis of seeming states in terms of belief or partial belief.

It has been suggested to me that these perceptual cases are not obvious instances of propositional seemings. Consider the stick case. This may be a case where the stick *looks bent*, but there is not a propositional seeming *that the stick is bent*.

I have two responses. First, saying *it seems that the stick is bent* is a very natural and seemingly appropriate way to describe the case. So, while the cases may not obviously involve propositional seemings, there is still some reason to think that the above case is metaphysically possible.

A second response is that there are a wide variety of non-moral, non-perceptual cases we could generate where it is more obvious that there is a propositional seeming that some proposition is true without a belief or partial belief. Consider a case of mistaken memory. Suppose I remember unwrapping a very special Christmas present. When I think back on it, I have memorial impressions of the the present being wrapped in red. I say, "It seems to me that the present was wrapped in red paper". Suppose I am shown a video recording of me opening the present, and I see clearly that the paper was green. It still seems to me that the paper was red, but I don't believe (or partially believe) that the present was wrapped in red. We can't respond to the memorial case in the same way we can the perceptual and moral cases, and so I think it still stands that (S1) has some counter-intuitive results.

I should note that I do not regard any of the foregoing as absolutely decisive, but we have, at a minimum, strong prima facie reasons for thinking that seeming states are

⁴ Ned Markosian came up with this example in a recent discussion.

not reducible to beliefs or partial beliefs. Let's turn our attention to another candidate analysis.

II. *Seemings as Attractions or Inclinations.*

One might think that we use *seem* as interchangeable with *attracted to believing* or *inclined to believe*. Consider the following passage from Ernest Sosa.

What *are* these seemings? It is helpful to compare deliberation on a choice or the pondering of a question, where we "weigh" reasons pro or con. Switching metaphors, we feel the "pull" of conflicting considerations. No matter the metaphor, the phenomenon is familiar to us all. There is something it is *like* to feel the pull of contrary attractions as we deliberate or ponder.⁵

Since Sosa talks about this as being metaphorical it is not clear that he is suggesting any sort of analysis of seemings here, but elsewhere Sosa seems to suggest that this is a candidate analysis.

Seemings, then whether sensory or intellectual, might be viewed as inclinations to believe on the basis of direct experience (sensory) or understanding (intellectual).⁶

This yields the following general analysis.

(S3) It seems to S that P if, and only if, S feels an attraction (or inclination) toward believing P.

I think there are two problems for (S3). First, imagine Sam's wife suddenly undergoes a radical religious conversion. After her conversion Sam starts to worry that she might divorce him if he doesn't eventually share her new religious beliefs. Sam's love for his wife might cause him to feel an attraction toward believing some propositions of her new found religion. There may be some psychological compulsion or pull in these cases. But it seems possible to feel such an attraction or pull without there being any kind of

⁵ Sosa (2007), p. 47.

⁶Sosa (1996), p.154

seeming state that the propositions are true. The propositions could seem false, and yet he might feel an attraction toward believing them.

However, notice that the second passage from Sosa includes a clause about the causal origin of the attraction. In the case of Sam, the causal origin of the attraction is not a sensory experience or some sort of understanding. Sosa could resist my counter example by inserting a causal origin clause.

However, there are other problems for (S3) even if it includes a causal origin clause. The basic idea is that that seemings are sometimes part of an explanation for why we feel an attraction or pull toward believing a proposition. Why do I feel pulled toward believing that torturing babies is wrong? Because that proposition seems true to me. If seemings are sometimes part of the explanation for why we are attracted to believing some propositions, then seemings aren't reducible to these attractions or pulls. The seeming is explanatorily prior to the attraction.⁷

Another problem for (S3) is that there is a genuine phenomenological difference between a seeming that P and an inclination to accept P. Perhaps the following example will help illustrate that there is such a difference.

When I was younger I found myself agreeing with my father on political issues. I would ask my dad why he thought Mr. X should be president. He would give me a few principles of government that he thought were true, and then he would tell me that Mr. X would best promote those principles. I then came to have inclinations to believe certain propositions about what governments ought to do and what a good political candidate

⁷ In trying to analyze a phenomenon he called "Seeing the Truth" Earl Conee (1998) presented the same kind of worry. He argued that if what is was to see the truth of a proposition was simply the attraction or pull we feel, then we are barred from explaining our attraction to the proposition in terms of our seeing the truth of the proposition. I'm making a similar argument here. I also recently discovered that Michael Huemer (forthcoming) makes a similar argument.

ought to promote. I was very much inclined (and disposed) to accept certain propositions that my father believed.

Today, I think I've thought about the issues more carefully, and I also think there is a new kind of attitudinal state I have toward some of these propositions that is different in a significant way from the attitudinal states I had toward those propositions when I was younger. When I was younger I was merely inclined to believe these propositions, but now I think that I am actually apprehending a truth in some significant way. I could be wrong. The apparent apprehension could be misleading, but what's important to note is that this seeming is phenomenally different from mere inclinations. When I reflect on the propositions now, there is something that it's like to be in this state I have (that I would call a *seeming*) that it was not like when I had the inclinations I had as a younger child.

One might argue that we can account for the phenomenal difference by saying that my inclinations are stronger now than they were when I was younger. The phenomenal difference, some might argue, is merely a difference in the strength of the inclination. However, I don't think we can explain this difference in terms of varying degrees of strength of inclination. My inclinations to believe the things I believed about government were pretty strong when I was younger - so strong that I might have continued to believe even when confronted with some good reasons or evidence to the contrary. I was a good little follower, and I had really strong inclinations. I don't think that my inclinations to believe now are any stronger than they were then. In fact, my inclinations now are probably weaker. It is much more likely that my beliefs would change in light of new reasons to favor contrary political views now than they once were.

But right now many of these political propositions *seem* true in a way that they did not when I was younger.⁸

III. Seemings as Truth-Directed Attractions

It has been suggested to me that some of my counterexamples to (S3) involve cases where the attractions in question are not appropriately truth-directed.⁹ In the wife scenario *the reason for* the attraction has to do with some desire to remain with the wife. In the scenario where I adopt the views of my father, one might argue that the primary source of the attraction (or inclination) is not some truth-directed feature of my psychology, but some suppressed desire to please my father or be like my father (or something along those lines).

In each case the *source* of the seeming in question is not appropriately truth directed. This suggests the following analysis of seemings.

(S4) It seems to S that P if, and only if, S feels a *truth directed* attraction toward believing P.

My major concern with (S4) has to do with what it would be for something to be a *truth directed attraction*.

The literature is filled with examples of philosophers talking about the fact that belief aims at truth.¹⁰ And proper functionalists talk about faculties that are aimed at

⁸ This latter argument is not likely to have universal appeal since it involves introspection that is not accessible to the reader. I can only invite the reader to determine if they have had experiences like this. That the argument won't have universal appeal should not prohibit it from being a rationally compelling argument for many people. It is surely acceptable in a wide range of cases to argue that two kinds of mental states are different because they are phenomenally distinct (e.g. pains/tickles and warm/cold sensations), and one of the best ways to know that two kinds of mental states are phenomenally distinct is by introspection.

⁹ I thank Daniel Howard-Snyder for this suggestion.

¹⁰ See for example Bernard Williams (1973). He argues that belief *aims at truth* and that this is one of the reasons that we should think that beliefs cannot be under our direct voluntary control. The aiming at truth notion could possibly give us an analysis of seemings that avoids some of my previous counterexamples.

truth.¹¹ I will borrow from the latter of these to offer an explanation for what it might mean for an attraction to be truth directed.

An attraction *A aims at truth* = df.) *A* was formed by cognitive faculties that are aimed at truth.

A cognitive faculty *C aims at truth* =df.) *C* was designed to secure true beliefs.

This gives us a more complete analysis of seemings that is less mysterious than the original (S4).

- (S4*) It seems to *S* that *P* if, and only if,
- (i) *S* feels an attraction *A* toward believing *P*.
 - (ii) *A* was caused by cognitive faculties designed to secure true beliefs.

But this approach to analyzing seemings has a serious problem. It is plausible to suppose that whether or not something seems true to you is something that you *could not be mistaken* about. Whether or not a proposition seems true to a person supervenes on internal states that are accessible to the agent. If this is true, then (S4*) cannot be an adequate analysis of *seemings* because this analysis entails that whether or not something seems true to a person supervenes on some external factors.

It is, of course, a good question whether or not we can be mistaken about the phenomenal characters of our appearances. Consider the following case.

You are walking toward a counter that has an electric frying pan on it. You have just been told to be careful of the pan because it is very hot. As you approach the counter, you trip and put your hand out to stop your fall. Your hand unfortunately comes down right on the pan. You immediately pull away, thinking:

(H) I am now having a sensation of extreme heat.

In fact, as you soon realize, the pan is actually not on. You did not feel heat at all.¹²

¹¹ See for example Plantinga (1993a), (1993b), and (1993c).

This case is supposed to challenge the idea that we could not be mistaken about the phenomenal character of our mental states. However, even if this case does successfully refute the claim that we cannot be mistaken about our mental states, my argument does not rely on that claim.

(S4*) not only entails that you could be mistaken about whether or not a proposition seems true to you in some cases, but it also entails that you could be *massively* and *systematically* mistaken about whether or not a proposition seems true to you in every single case where you think a proposition seems true to you.

Imagine your brain-in-a-vat twin. Your brain-in-a-vat twin is internally identical to you. Whatever you believe he believes. Whatever you're inclined to believe, he is inclined to believe. Whatever appears to you to be the case, appears to your brain-in-a-vat twin to be the case. The difference between you and your brain-in-a-vat twin is that his cognitive faculties were not designed to secure true beliefs. Suppose your twin had a designer that wanted him to form beliefs on the basis of the same data you form yours, because his designer wanted him to have false beliefs.

This case is supposed to be set up so that you have a brain-in-a-vat twin that, by hypothesis, does not have cognitive faculties designed to secure true beliefs. Assuming this case is metaphysically possible, (S4*) would entail that every time your brain-in-a-vat twin forms the belief that something seems true, he is wrong. That's much more counterintuitive. Surely the brain-in-a-vat twin won't be wrong *every single time* just

¹² I borrow this example from Richard Feldman (2003), pp. 55. It is also discussed in Lehrer (1974) and Pojman (1999).

because his cognitive faculties weren't designed to secure true beliefs. He is internally identical to you, so whenever something seems true to you it should seem true to him.¹³

Please note that I am not assuming internalism about justification here. It may be that seemings are only relevant to justification if they are caused by faculties aimed at true or meet some other externalist condition on justification, however, whether or not something *is in fact* a seeming state seems to be completely independent of what externalist conditions are met.

V. Seemings as Felt Demand

The only philosopher I am aware of who has made some serious attempts to elucidate the nature of seeming states is William Tolhurst. He offers us the following condition on whether or not something counts as a seeming:

- (S5) It seems to S that P only if
 - (i) S is in a mental state M whose content is P
 - (ii) M has a property (felt veridicality) which
 - (a) evokes in S the felt demand that S believe P, and
 - (b) would, other things equal, evoke in S the felt demand that S believe that M if S were to reflect on her experience of M.¹⁴

We should note that (S5) is not an analysis of seemings. It merely states some necessary conditions for having a seeming, and it does avoid some of the worries we faced with some of the previous analyses of seeming states. Instead of identifying seemings with some feeling or attraction, Tolhurst states that seemings are *the cause* of some feeling or attraction.

¹³ There are difficulties here with whether or not it is metaphysically possible to have a brain-in-a-vat twin that has cognitive faculties that do not aim-at-truth, but that largely because the notion of some cognitive faculty *aiming-at-truth* is very mysterious. In fact, it's more mysterious than the initial concept of *seeming* that we're seeking to analyze. This incidentally is another reason that I am dubious of an analysis of seemings that invokes concept *aims-at-truth*.

¹⁴ William Tolhurst (1998).

That said, it's not clear that (S5) helps us understand more clearly what a seeming is supposed to be. 'Felt veridicality' is a technical term, and it's not clear what it is for a mental state to have the property *felt veridicality*. I think Tolhurst intends for 'felt veridicality' to be a stipulative term to denote a kind of mental property whereby a mental state satisfies conditions (a) and (b).

If we set aside the notion of *felt veridicality* in this way, then maybe Tolhurst's condition will be a useful way for some to think about seemings. However, for some that do not think they have an adequate grasp on what a seeming is, it's not clear that replacing 'seeming' with 'cause of a felt demand' will be helpful.

More importantly, setting aside worries about how best to understand felt veridicality and whether that gives us a better grasp of what seemings are, (S5) remains compatible with the view that seemings are irreducible propositional attitudes. Tolhurst tells us that whatever seemings are, they are the things that cause felt demands (to believe). We do not know from what Tolhurst says if we are to identify M with any other kind of mental state or not. Seemings could still be irreducible on Tolhurst's view.

VI. The Consequence of a Brute Seeming View

I think we must regard seeming states as irreducible propositional attitudes. They are not beliefs, partial beliefs, attractions, inclinations, or dispositions. They may be mental states that cause felt demands, but that's compatible with their being irreducibly brute states. I'm not sure what other sort of analysis there is that we might offer. I don't mean to conclude that my arguments are decisive, and my failure to find a reduction does not entail that there is no reduction. However, I have considered what I take to be the main candidates for a reduction. I think that they are unsuccessful, and absent any other

competitors I think the reasonable (but certainly defeasible) conclusion to draw is that seemings are irreducible.

One might worry about positing the existence of seemings, at all. If it cannot be reduced to some other mental phenomena that we are more familiar with, then perhaps we should just eliminate it. One could argue that what I have shown is that there simply is no unified and interesting concept of a *seeming*.

In fact, there is a plausible explanation for our seeming talk. It has been suggested to me that locutions like ‘...seems true to me’ might be merely polite ways of expressing an opinion while acknowledging the possibility of error.

There are many ways that we politely express an opinion while acknowledging the possibility of error. Consider the following examples:

(A) **I saw what looked like** a wolf, not a dog.

(B) From where I was sitting, **I saw** anger on his face.

(C) **I heard sounds that resembled** gunfire.

(D) Well, it certainly **smells** spoiled.

If you think you saw a wolf, and someone tells you it was a dog. If you disagree, you might utter something like (A). If you think someone looked angry, but someone disagrees and says that it was a look of confusion, you might utter something like (B). You can probably imagine situations where you might utter (C) and (D) as a polite way of expressing disagreement. One might argue that utterances like the following are similar in purpose to utterances like (A)-(D).

(E) **It seems that** the stick is bent.

(F) **It seems that** the earth is flat.

It could be argued that since these are merely ways of politely expressing an opinion while acknowledging the possibility of error, we need not take them as having any serious ontological commitment.

There is, however, a problem with this. First, notice that utterances of (A)-(F) will not always be polite ways of expressing an opinion. In fact, you can utter (A)-(F) without having the content of the propositional attitude verbs as opinions at all. It is not an essential feature of those utterances, in English, that they be used to express opinions. Just because (A)-(D) are often used to politely express disagreement doesn't support the claim that we ought to be anti-realists about visual, auditory, and olfactory impressions.

A second point involves noting what unifies (A)-(F). Even if we acknowledge that these are common ways to politely express disagreement, it would be worth asking *why* these count as polite ways of expressing disagreement. I think a plausible explanation for why these are polite ways of expressing disagreement is that we retreat to citing a *form of evidence* that we think the hearer will not object to. But retreating to that *form of evidence* quantifies over that form of evidence. We readily accept that there are such things as visual, auditory, and olfactory impressions. If expressing propositions that include seeming states like (E) - (F) play the same role as expressing propositions like (A) - (D), then we don't have reason to eliminate seemings states from our ontology. On the contrary, we have more reason to admit them.

The main point is that when someone disagrees with you, often the polite thing to do is retreat from the belief claim and cite an acceptable piece of evidence. The fact that we can permissibly do this with seemings, actually gives us some reason to think that there are seeming states that people often treat as acceptable evidence.

My arguments are not decisive either for the claim that there are seemings nor for the claim that seemings ought to be regarded as brute, irreducible mental states. I think it is, however, reasonable to accept both conclusions.

This brings me to one epistemological upshot. Hopefully, what I have argued for here can provide proponents of views that seemings can do epistemic work principled reasons to endorse what would otherwise be an awkward position. For example, consider the following view about epistemic justification called *Phenomenal Conservatism*.

Phenomenal Conservatism (PC)

If it seems to S that P is true and you have no defeating evidence, then S is justified in believing P is true.¹⁵

I think that something like PC is true, but what I argue for here puts me in an uncomfortable position. PC can explain how a lot of beliefs can be justified.¹⁶ However, some are worried about the principle because they do not think they have an adequate grasp on what seemings are.¹⁷ To say that seemings are irreducible mental phenomena is very unhelpful.

¹⁵ I countenance, at least, two kinds of defeaters, and both are internal states. Alston calls them *rebutting* and *undercutting* defeaters. Rebutting defeaters are internal evidential states that count as stronger evidence against the proposition than the seeming state. For example, if it seems to me that there is a zebra in the room, but then my friend tells me that he has just cleverly disguised a mule, that evidence outweighs the seeming. That's an example of a rebutting defeater.

Undercutting defeaters are internal evidential states that give the person some reason to think that the source of their evidence is likely to be misleading in the particular case. For example, if I seem to see a tiger in the room, but I'm told that I have just taken a drug that induces tiger hallucinations, I would have an undercutting defeater.

There are very difficult questions concerning how defeaters ought to be weighed that a full blown defense of PC needs to answer. I only add these clarifications to give the reader a clearer idea of the principle I have in mind. I acknowledge that there are *several* problems for phenomenal conservatism. My primary concern in this paper is not to defend the truth of PC from all possible objections (there are many). Phenomenal conservatism is being introduced here *as an example* of a view that holds that seeming states can do epistemic work. My primary concern in this section is to argue that a brute view of seemings need not threaten any view that holds that seeming states can do epistemic work.

¹⁶ It can also offer a nice, non-arbitrary, unified explanation for how lots of different kinds of beliefs are justified. Perceptual beliefs, philosophical beliefs, and moral beliefs (if some in all three categories are justified) might all have their justificatory status explained by PC.

¹⁷ I have never seen this worry in print, but Richard Feldman and John Schoemaker have both noted that this is a worry that someone might have.

It would be nice if we could reduce seemings to some mental state that we are more familiar with, and it would help alleviate some concerns that some have with phenomenal conservatism. However, I think that proponents of something like PC are going to have to proceed without being able to provide any such reduction.

This may not be so bad for the proponent of PC. My attempt to reduce seemings to other mental states led to a discussion revealing that we have some good independent reasons to believe that there are seemings. They are useful to explain the presence of other kinds of mental states like beliefs, attractions, inclinations, and dispositions. And it seems that there is a phenomenal difference between these other mental states and seemings. That by itself might be good enough reason to think that there are seemings. They are theoretically useful. If we have these independent reasons to accept the irreducible existence of seemings, then perhaps the proponent of phenomenal conservatism can feel more comfortable using them to do epistemological work as well. It's not illegitimate to appeal to seemings to explain other phenomenon, and since many of us are familiar with the phenomenon of a proposition seeming true, perhaps it's not so illegitimate to put seemings to epistemic work.^{18, 19}

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¹⁸ Phenomenal conservatism has many other problems that need to be addressed. I address them in another paper. My only concern here is to note that the mere fact that seemings are irreducible is not one of those problems.

¹⁹This paper benefited from helpful discussion and feedback from several people. In particular, I would like to thank Richard Feldman, Earl Conee, Ed Wierenga, Jonathan Shoemaker, Daniel Howard-Snyder, Ned Markosian, Joshua Spencer, Chris Tillman, Andrei Buckareff, Daniel Mittag, and Sharon Ryan.

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